Deflation and output across sectors: results for the Czech Republic by Ryska, Pavel & Sklenář, Petr
94 2018, XXI, 4
Ekonomie
DOI: 10.15240/tul/001/2018-4-007
Introduction
The study of defl ation seems to be gaining 
ever more importance. Central banks in most 
advanced economies, including the European 
Central Bank and the Czech National Bank, 
have observed CPI infl ation running below their 
targets or even in outright defl ationary territory. 
These central banks argue that defl ation should 
be avoided at all costs and employ extraordinary 
policies such as quantitative easing, foreign 
exchange interventions or negative nominal 
interest rates to fi ght against it. As these 
policies have not always led to higher economic 
growth and higher infl ation, there have been 
calls for even more extraordinary measures. 
Among those is a proposal to abolish cash 
money in order to allow banks to carry over the 
negative interest rates more effi ciently on their 
depositors and stoke infl ation (see e.g. Buiter, 
(2009) or Rogoff (2014)). Therefore, a lot is at 
stake in knowing whether defl ation (especially 
mild defl ation) should be avoided by all means.
There are substantial problems with studies 
that have tried to assess the relationship 
between economic growth and the price level. 
First, all of them have used aggregate data for 
countries such as GDP and CPI. While aggregate 
variables provide information about the economy 
as a whole, they cannot reveal the potential 
variation in output and prices that takes place 
‘inside’ the economy. As a result, we know very 
little about whether fi rms and sectors within the 
economy face defl ation and where it comes from. 
We can also hardly assess whether defl ation-
recession theories hold. Second, episodes of 
defl ation in the aggregate CPI or in the GDP 
defl ator have been scarce in the past decades. 
As a result, studies on defl ation have had to 
rely on historical data, often before World War I. 
Whatever these studies show, their conclusions 
can be criticized as irrelevant, because they are 
based on outdated observations.
In this paper, we take a different approach. 
Instead of using aggregate data on GDP and 
infl ation, we focus on sector data on production 
and prices. Specifi cally, we use data from the 
Czech Statistical Offi ce on production, gross 
value added and prices in sectors of the Czech 
economy from 1993 to 2015. This dataset has 
three advantages: (1) it is rich in information on 
fi rms’ output and inputs, (2) it provides recent 
observations, and (3) it contains numerous 
episodes of sector defl ation, which would on 
the macroeconomic level be concealed under 
the aggregate CPI or defl ator numbers. We 
think this approach is novel: we do not know of 
another study that would analyze defl ation and 
growth using sector data.
We fi nd that, contrary to common wisdom, 
defl ationary pressures in the Czech economy 
have been coming from sectors with increasing 
output and increasing gross value added, 
not from the deteriorating ones. This shows 
that defl ation was most often growth-driven, 
representing rising productivity.
This text proceeds as follows. In Section 1, 
we present the current state of research 
on defl ation and show its main drawbacks. 
In Section 2, we present our sector data 
from national accounts. We fi rst show some 
descriptive statistics in Section 3. We then 
perform regression analysis in Section 4, where 
we use the fi xed effects model and General 
Method of Moments estimation to regress the 
growth in production and gross value added on 
the growth of prices plus control variables. The 
last section concludes the paper.
1. Current Research
1.1 Empirical Studies
There are three main lines of reasoning why 
defl ation is thought by many to be harmful 
for economic growth. First, the expectation of 
falling prices may delay spending by consumers 
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and businesses. Firms see their revenues fall 
and if they cannot adjust wages and other costs 
accordingly, their margins shrink and they have 
to lay off workers. Second, for a given nominal 
interest rate, defl ation raises the real interest 
rate, which in turn might deter investment. 
Third, if there is signifi cant indebtedness in the 
economy, defl ation may cause bankruptcies as 
it increases the real value of debt.
Several studies have attempted to assess 
empirically whether the alleged link between 
defl ation and recession holds. Bordo and 
Redish (2003) restrict their attention to the 
United States and Canada in the period 1870-
1913, which was rich in episodes of defl ation. 
They fi nd that prices did not affect output. Bordo, 
Lane and Redish (2004) add Germany to the 
sample and reach a similar conclusion. Other 
recent studies use long datasets that span more 
than a century and contain many countries. 
Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) conclude from their 
regression of output growth on growth of prices 
that in the whole sample, the correlation is 
close to zero. An exception is the subsample of 
the Great Depression in the 1930s, where the 
link was positive. Borio and Filardo (2004) as 
well as Borio et al. (2015) generally confirm this 
result. By contrast, Guerrero and Parker (2006) 
lean to the conclusion that defl ation is bad 
for growth, fi nding an economically small but 
statistically signifi cant link. According to them, 
lagged defl ation negatively affects output. 
Benhabib and Spiegel (2009) fi nd a non-linear 
relationship between defl ation and recession.
In recent years, some researchers have 
focused on the link between expected infl ation 
(or defl ation) and consumption. Interestingly, 
they have produced starkly different results. 
Bachmann, Berg and Sims (2015), using recent 
data on the US economy, refuse the hypothesis 
that the expectation of defl ation leads to lower 
present consumption. By contrast, Ichiue and 
Nishiguchi (2014) support this hypothesis using 
survey data on modern Japan.
Overall, the existing empirical work on 
deflation is rather limited – which is surprising 
given its importance for monetary policy – and 
inconclusive. As we explain below, there is 
a major problem of applicability of the majority 
of these studies to modern-day monetary policy.
1.2 ‘Good’ or ‘Bad’ Defl ation?
Two lines of thought can be traced in current 
mainstream macroeconomics. The fi rst group 
considers defl ation decisively harmful and 
studies ways to avoid it. Here we can include 
infl uential macroeconomists Krugman (1998), 
Bernanke (2002) or Svensson (2003).
The second group takes a more detailed look 
at defl ation. Bordo and Redish (2003) coined 
the terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’ defl ation. Defl ation 
is of the good type if is associated with rising 
output. In particular, good defl ation occurs when 
fi rms invest to decrease unit costs and increase 
output. As a result, if the economy operates 
with a constant money supply, consumers buy 
an increased output with the same amount of 
money, so the price level decreases. This is 
a synonym for an outward shift in the aggregate 
supply curve. This situation is thought to have 
been typical for the pre-World War I period.
By contrast, bad defl ation is associated with 
falling output. In this case, defl ation results from 
decreasing nominal demand, which cannot 
be immediately passed on to lower prices of 
inputs. Firms see their profi tability decrease 
and cut production. This was most probably one 
of the characteristics of the Great Depression of 
the 1930s.
Other works adhering to this distinction 
between good and bad defl ation include 
Beckworth (2007), Bordo and Filardo (2005) 
and to a certain extent also Borio et al. (2015).
The terms good and bad defl ation do not 
describe causality – they only describe 
correlations. For example, bad defl ation does 
not necessarily mean that defl ation causes 
falling output. Decreasing prices may only be 
a symptom of falling demand, not the root cause 
itself. However, the terms may be useful in 
practice because policymakers try to determine 
the type and decide whether they should or 
should not counteract it. If defl ation results from 
decreasing nominal demand, central banks 
consider it undesirable and prefer to offset it 
by easing policy. On the contrary, if it results 
from cheaper production without direct link to 
demand, central banks may be more willing to 
let such defl ation run its course. Therefore, if we 
fi nd that most defl ation going on in the economy 
is of the good type, it may have a direct policy 
implication.
For these purposes, the existing empirical 
research has a clear disadvantage. All the 
studies mentioned in Section 1.1 use only 
aggregate macroeconomic variables, most 
often the GDP and CPI infl ation. This causes 
a trade-off: the aggregate annual data do not 
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show almost any years with defl ation in the last 
decades for most developed economies (For 
the Czech Republic, too, the aggregate price 
defl ator shows only one year with defl ation in 
the period 1993-2015.). When researches want 
to use aggregate data and learn more about 
defl ation, they have to use pre-World War I data 
which are rich in observations of defl ation. But 
then the results are based on old observations 
which may have little relevance for today 
because monetary regimes have changed, 
there are starkly different levels of debt, there is 
more fi nancial intermediation, etc.
By contrast, using sector data, we have 
many episodes of modern-day defl ation and 
we circumvent the trade-off. We are thus better 
equipped to make judgments about a potential 
link between prices and output and to assess 
particular defl ation-recession theories. (Below 
we use the terms infl ation and defl ation also 
for the change of sector prices. Some may 
insist that infl ation and defl ation denote only 
aggregate price movements, but not sector price 
movements. However, all aggregate numbers 
have their sources in their components, and 
it is precisely these sources that we analyse 
below. Thus we use infl ation and defl ation in 
the broader sense.)
2. Data
We use data from the Czech Statistical Offi ce 
(2017). It has complete data on 86 sectors 
of the Czech economy as defi ned in national 
accounts. The defi nition of each industry is 
based on NACE classifi cation and values are 
published in the statistics of National Accounts. 
The data spans from 1993 to 2015.
As we use growth in variables rather 
than levels, one time period drops out, so 
we have 22 time periods. That gives a total 
of 1892 observations. The variables are 
output prices (implicit price defl ator), output, 
gross value added (GVA), employment and 
intermediate inputs. Output, GVA, employment 
and intermediate inputs are available both in 
nominal and real terms, but in this article we 
use them in real terms (i.e., in constant prices) 
as we are interested in assessing the effect of 
prices on real output of fi rms.
An important feature of the NACE 
classifi cation is that it does not cover only 
sectors producing for fi nal consumption, but 
also sectors upper in the production chain 
– i.e., sectors producing capital goods and 
intermediate inputs. As a result, fi rms’ output 
does not mean only consumer goods bought 
by consumers, but also capital goods bought by 
other fi rms.
Fig. 1: Production and GVA growth against change of prices
Source: Czech Statistical Offi ce (2017), own computations
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3. Descriptive Statistics
In our sample, positive price growth prevails 
and accounts for 80% of all observations (see 
Fig. 1). At the same time, approximately three 
fi fths of observations have positive growth of 
production and gross value added. As a result, 
roughly half of observations lie in the top-right 
quadrant in Fig. 1. In this section we focus on 
basic statistical relationships between the sign 
of price change (infl ation/defl ation) and the 
sign and growth rate of production or GVA. 
In particular, we focus on whether declines in 
production are associated with defl ation.
In Tab. 1, we report the comparison of 
growth in production and gross value added 
under increasing versus decreasing prices. 
We also visualize the comparisons with density 
graphs in Fig. 2. Out of observations with price 
defl ation, 69.7% recorded positive growth 
in real production, while the corresponding 
percentage for observations with infl ation is only 
58.8%. This is also refl ected in the averages: 
the average growth rate of production during 
episodes of price defl ation is 5.47%, which is 
sizably higher than the average growth with 
infl ation (2.85%). Therefore, this preliminary 
observation contradicts the notion that defl ation 
is linked to subpar output growth. To check this 
fi nding, we also ran a formal test of equality 
of means. As seen in Tab. 2, the t-test rejects 
the null hypothesis that the average production 
growth under infl ation is equal to that under 
defl ation, thereby confi rming the fi nding. In 
contrast, the standard deviations of growth 
rates are similar, which is also supported by the 
testing of equality of variances.
We performed the same analysis also 
for real gross value added (see Tab. 1). Here 
the better performance under defl ation is 
even more pronounced: 77.8% of defl ationary 
observations report positive growth in gross 
value added, while for infl ationary observations 
the percentage is only 52.3%. The average 
growth of gross value added is 14.1% with 
defl ation, while only 0.68% with infl ation. The 
difference is also confi rmed by the t-test. The 
only difference with gross value added as 
opposed to production is the higher standard 
deviation with defl ation than with infl ation.
The reason for these rather convincing 
fi ndings may be the prevalence of ‘good 
defl ation’ in our sample: the sectors that 
reported product price defl ation could be 
precisely the ones that invested most in 
production and therefore enabled cheaper and 
greater production. Anyway, this preliminary 
look runs against the claim that defl ation harms 
prospects for growth.
In the Appendix, we reverse our perspective 
and ask the question how much growth in 
prices there is under the opposite scenarios 
of rise and fall in production and GVA. 
All data Infl ation Defl ation
Observations 1,892 1,509 383
Production
  obs. with production increase 61.00% 58.80% 69.70%
  obs. with production decrease 39.00% 41.20% 30.30%
Mean growth 3.38 2.85 5.47
Standard deviation of growth 12.89 12.71 13.39
Gross value added
  obs. with GVA increase 57.50% 52.30% 77.80%
  obs. with GVA decrease 42.50% 47.70% 22.20%
Mean growth 3.40 0.68 14.10
Standard deviation of growth 34.86 25.74 57.05
Source: Czech Statistical Offi ce (2017), own computations
Tab. 1: Growth of production and GVA under infl ation and defl ation
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This complements our result here that slower 
price growth or outright defl ation is accompanied 
by quicker output growth.
4. Regression Analysis
4.1 Time Averages
As a fi rst look on correlations, we performed 
a simple regression of time averages. We 
regressed average annual output growth in the 
86 sectors of the Czech economy over 1993-
2015 on the corresponding average annual 
price growth, as seen in Tab. 3.
In what follows below, we denote x the 
annual percentage change in variable X. 
That is, p is the growth in prices, q in real 
output (production) and gva in real gross 
value added. We tested the results in Tab. 3 
for the presence of heteroscedasticity and 
whenever it was detected we used the White’s 
heteroscedasticity-corrected covariance matrix.
Test statistic p-value
Production
    t-test for equality of means 3.44*** <0.001
    F-test for equality of variances 1.11 0.19
Gross value added
    t-test for equality of means 4.49*** <0.001
    F-test for equality of variances 4.91*** <0.001
Source: Czech Statistical Offi ce (2017), own computations
Note: We use the Welch t-test, i.e., a standard unpaired and two-sided t-test to determine whether the means of produ-
ction growth under infl ation and defl ation are equal to each other. The null hypothesis is that the two means are equal. 
To test the equality of variances, we use an F-test, where the null hypothesis is that the ratio of the variances of the 
samples is equal to 1.
Note: The sign *** denotes signifi cance at 1% level.
Tab. 2: Tests of equality of means and variances
Fig. 2: Density of production and GVA growth under defl ation and infl ation
Source: Czech Statistical Offi ce (2017), own computations
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The regression coeffi cient on p (percentage 
growth in prices) is -1.142, signifi cant at 1%, 
suggesting that slower price growth has been 
associated with faster output growth. As 
depicted in Fig. 3, there is one distinct outlier 
on top left. This sector is the manufacturing 
of computer, electronic and optical products. 
Interestingly, it is both the sector with the 
fastest growth rate of production and the only 
sector with average annual defl ation over 1993-
2015. We also ran the regression without this 
outlier, but the negative coeffi cient and high 
statistical signifi cance remain (see Tab. 3). 
We tried leaving out up to 10 most extreme 
observations, but the negative and statistically 
signifi cant coeffi cient for p remained.
We can observe the general pattern of the 
sectors in the Czech economy from Fig. 3: while 
All data Without outlier
Coeffi cient p-value Coeffi cient p-value
Regressing q on:
Intercept 7.082*** <0.001 -6.118*** <0.001
p -1.142*** <0.001 -0.919*** <0.001
Observations 86 85
Adj. R2 0.237 0.167
Regressing gva on:
Intercept 8.996*** <0.001 8.824*** <0.001
p  -1.998*** <0.001 -1.819*** <0.001
Observations 86 85
Adj. R2 0.380 0.323
Source: Czech Statistical Offi ce (2017), own computations
Note: The sign *** denotes signifi cance at 1% level.
Tab. 3: Time averages: Regression of average annual growth in output and GVA on infl ation
Fig. 3: Regressing time averages: (a) Output growth on infl ation, (b) GVA growth on infl ation (all data)
Source: Czech Statistical Offi ce (2017), own computations
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the contracting sectors had both low and high 
infl ation, booming sectors tended to have lower 
infl ation and those that expanded most quickly 
– with growth rate of output above 10% – had 
exclusively low infl ation or outright defl ation.
The results suggest that higher output 
growth is linked to slower price growth, i.e. low 
infl ation or outright defl ation. However, it may 
not be evident what happens to fi rms’ profi ts 
as infl ation slows or turns into defl ation. We 
therefore used growth in real gross value added 
instead of real output growth and regressed it 
on price growth. The results are very similar to 
those with output growth (see Tab. 3 and Fig. 3).
Overall, this evidence too seems to run 
against the defl ation-recession theories. In our 
sample, faster output growth and profi t growth 
are associated with slower infl ation or outright 
defl ation. This could suggest that higher 
production most often results from investment 
into lower-cost production, to which consumers 
react by purchasing more.
4.2 Panel Data
Two Models
Using panel data naturally offers much more 
information than time averages because 
we can make use of the entire variation of 
annual observations. Our data are in the form 
of balanced panel data and we use the fi xed 
effects model for estimation. This model allows 
unobserved sector-specifi c effects to have any 
correlation with the explicit regressors. We 
estimated the models below using the so-called 
‘within estimation’.
Generally, we use two economic models 
for estimation. The fi rst is an autoregressive 
distributed lag (ADL) model which takes 
a macroeconomic approach to prices and 
production. Just as studies cited in Section 1.1 
regress GDP growth on price growth (infl ation 
or defl ation), we regress sector output growth 
on the respective growth in output prices for 
the given sector. This directly addresses the 
question of correlation between prices and 
output. We also include lagged variables. For 
example, we estimate
qit = â0 + â1qit-1 + â2 pit + â3 pit-1 + ai + uit (1)
where qit is real output growth in sector i and 
year t, pit growth in output prices in the sector 
(both in percent terms), ai the sector-specifi c 
unobserved effect and uit the error term.
The second model, in contrast, takes 
a more microeconomic, fi rm-level approach. To 
produce output, fi rms must employ workers and 
buy intermediate inputs. Therefore, the model 
we estimate is
qit = â0 + b1 pit + â 2empit + â3inpit + ai + uit (2)
where emp is growth in labour employed 
(measured in total hours worked) and inp 
growth in the volume of intermediate inputs in 
production.
The regressors include two usual inputs in 
the neoclassical production function (for why 
we exclude capital K, see our discussion below) 
plus a special term – the output price change 
p. Productivity, or effi ciency of production, is 
usually accounted for as a residual, i.e., what 
remains unexplained in output produced if we 
take into account changes in labour, capital 
and intermediate inputs. Firms typically invest 
or take other measures in order to make 
production more effi cient. After they do so, they 
can produce more and with lower costs, so 
they can offer their products more cheaply and 
reach more customers. If this is the case, then 
the output price P acts as a proxy for effi ciency. 
The lower is the cost of production, the lower is 
the observed price P. Therefore, price growth 
p is not only a variable that we add to fi nd out 
about its correlation with output growth q, but it 
also has a concrete economic interpretation as 
a proxy for the effi ciency of production.
Equation 1 above contains the lagged 
dependent variable qit-1 among regressors. 
As a result, the fi xed-effects estimator is 
generally not consistent. As Wooldridge (2002) 
shows, the bias falls at a rate 1/T as T grows, 
and for a time dimension high enough, the 
inconsistency would be negligible. We think that 
with our T = 22, we do have a T high enough 
to be sure that most of the bias disappears. 
However, as a check we also perform General 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation in 
equations where there are lagged dependent 
variables. Our GMM estimation follows Arellano 
and Bond’s (1991) two-step procedure and 
we use lags of order 2 to 5 of the dependent 
variable as instrumental variables. Finally, in 
the fi xed effects models below, each regression 
was tested for heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation. When either of these was detected, 
a robust variance matrix estimator was used to 
correct the variances and test statistics.
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Results: Macroeconomic Approach
In the fi rst, macroeconomic approach, we 
estimate the effect of infl ation on output growth 
and GVA growth in an autoregressive distributed 
lag model. Tab. 4 shows that contemporaneous 
infl ation pt is negatively linked with output 
growth, confi rming our fi ndings from Section 
4.1 above. The GMM estimation brings an 
estimate of the coeffi cient of pt very similar to 
the fi xed effects estimation (-0.303 vs. -0.293) 
and confi rms its statistical signifi cance. By 
contrast, the coeffi cient of pt-1 is economically 
and statistically less signifi cant, both according 
to fi xed effects estimation and GMM. Similarly 
to output, infl ation is negatively linked to the 
growth in gross value added of fi rms (see the 
lower half of Tab. 4).
The only difference is that the magnitude 
of the coeffi cient of pt is bigger for gross value 
added than for output as dependent variable. 
This is understandable since fi rms usually have 
operating leverage: a rise in output (revenues) by 
1% causes a rise in gross profi t of more than 1%.
Results: Production-Function Approach
In the second, more microeconomic approach, 
we use typical inputs into production function 
as control variables for assessing the impact 
of infl ation on output growth. These should 
be more powerful control variables as they 
are directly linked to output. We estimate 
the equation with growth in labour emp (total 
hours worked) and growth in the volume of 
intermediate inputs inp as controls.
We have also added growth in gross capital 
stock k to imitate more the traditional production 
function Y = f(L, K). Because data on capital 
stock have poorer availability than other data, 
we used an alternative source from the OECD 
(2016). It is both narrower (only 57 sectors) and 
shorter (1995-2009) than our main dataset, so 
it has much fewer observations (798). Results 
from this enlarged regression that includes 
k are not materially different from those reported 
in Tab. 5 and we do not report them here.
As expected, this model shows a much 
higher fi t as Adj. R2 is as high as 0.638 in 
the output regression in Tab. 5. And again, 
infl ation negatively affects output growth 
(-0.476) with high statistical signifi cance. 
Labour and intermediate inputs also have the 
expected signs and high signifi cance. In the 
GVA regression, infl ation also has a negative 
coeffi cient and the coeffi cient is again greater 
in absolute magnitude. Interestingly, while the 
labour input has a positive and statistically 
signifi cant impact on GVA, intermediate inputs 
lose their signifi cance.
Interpretation
The empirical results bring, in our view, two 
important fi ndings.
Fixed effects GMM
Coeffi cient p-value Coeffi cient p-value
Regressing qt on:
qt-1 0.012 0.696 0.042 0.231
pt -0.293*** 0.003 -0.303** 0.014
pt-1 0.136* 0.052 0.110 0.121
Observations 1,806 1,720
Adj. R2 0.017 -
Regressing gvat on:
gvat-1 -0.086*** 0.002 -0.178 0.236
pt -1.614*** <0.001 -1.768*** <0.001
pt-1 0.614 0.173 0.393 0.617
Observations 1,806 1,720
Adj. R2 0.068 -
Source: Czech Statistical Offi ce (2017), own computations
Note: The sign * denotes statistical signifi cance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% level.
Tab. 4: ADL: Regression of growth in output and GVA on infl ation
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Firstly, the negative relationship between 
growth in output and growth in prices suggests 
that observed defl ation has been predominantly 
of the ‘good’ type. If falling prices resulted 
from falling nominal demand, fi rms would not 
respond by increasing production – on the 
contrary, they would cut it, as the ‘bad defl ation’ 
hypothesis goes. Hence, we would observe 
a positive correlation between p and q.
The alternative hypothesis is that as fi rms 
invest and improve effi ciency, they manage 
to cut unit costs and prices. This allows 
them to sell more products, i.e., reach new 
marginal demand through lower prices. This 
‘good defl ation’ hypothesis is consistent with 
our fi ndings – we see repeatedly a negative 
relationship between p and q.
It could be argued that the negative 
relationship between p and q may in some 
more infl ationary years refl ect rather the 
comparison of high versus low infl ation than 
infl ation versus defl ation. That may be true. 
The shift of the aggregate demand curve – for 
example, through central bank easing – may 
move the whole mass of observations to the 
right in Fig. 3, bringing many of them out of 
the defl ationary section. Symmetrically, lack 
of aggregate nominal demand may push them 
to the left, which was the case for instance 
in 2009 when the economy as a whole had 
a 1.4% defl ation (measured as output defl ator). 
However, rather than focusing on the position of 
the mass of observations, we are interested in 
the slope of the regression line – that is, in the 
shape of the mass. Its negative slope suggests 
that the tendency to cut prices or at least have 
slower price increases than the average is 
associated with growing fi rms, not declining 
ones. Overall, we are not claiming that ‘bad 
defl ation’ does not exist or that it cannot be 
harmful. We are only showing evidence that 
there is much more ‘good defl ation’ than ‘bad 
defl ation’ in our sample.
Secondly, using gross value added in 
addition to output, we have shown that lower 
prices are not only associated with greater 
output, but also with greater gross profi t of 
fi rms. Output in itself is not the fi rms’ goal, but 
profi t is. If fi rms invest to increase production 
and cut prices, they also succeed in increasing 
profi ts, our results show. This fi nding is important 
because one line of reasoning (starting with 
Fisher, 1933) is that defl ation or too low infl ation 
ultimately erodes fi rms’ profi ts and leads them to 
bankruptcies. Our results show otherwise, again 
providing support for the case that defl ation in 
our sample stems from fi rms’ own initiatives, not 
from negative shocks that would squeeze profi ts.
As pointed out in Section 2, the sectors 
used are not only those that produce consumer 
Fixed effects
Coeffi cient p-value
Regressing qt on:
pt -0.476*** <0.001
empt 0.280*** <0.001
inpt 0.582*** <0.001
Observations 1,700
Adj. R2 0.638
Regressing gvat on:
pt -1.663*** <0.001
empt 0.889*** <0.001
inpt 0.062 0.637
Observations 1,700
Adj. R2 0.112
Source: Czech Statistical Offi ce (2017), own computations
Note: The sign *** denotes signifi cance at 1% level.
Tab. 5: Production function: Regression of growth in output and GVA on infl ation
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goods, but also those that produce capital 
goods or intermediate inputs for other fi rms. 
This has an important implication. Our results 
are not only evidence on consumers’ reaction to 
lower prices by fi rms – they are also evidence 
on fi rms’ reaction to lower prices by other 
fi rms, which is an area completely neglected 
by existing research. Therefore, we show that 
defl ation or below-average infl ation in output 
prices allows fi rms to sell more of their products 
to both consumers and other fi rms and to 
increase gross profi ts.
A comparison of our results with other 
studies is diffi cult because no other authors, to 
the best of our knowledge, have used sector 
data to inspect the relationship between prices 
and output or gross value added. We can only 
make comparisons in a broad sense – i.e., 
take our sector output and sector prices as 
counterparts to GDP and aggregate prices 
in other studies and compare the results. In 
this respect, our results generally confi rm the 
results of Atkeson and Kehoe (2004), Borio 
and Filardo (2004) and Borio et al. (2015) who 
did not fi nd evidence of a defl ation-depression 
link in large datasets. Interestingly, all of these 
studies include pre-World War I data, which are 
rich in defl ation. This is no coincidence, in our 
view. Some sectors in our dataset resemble the 
defl ationary period 1866-1914 in the US and 
elsewhere which displayed frequent defl ation 
with relatively high growth rates of output 
(Beckworth, 2007; Bagus, 2015). Their common 
feature is likely to be the underlying growth 
in productivity which links growth in output to 
reductions in prices. Our results differ from 
Guerrero and Parker (2006) who report negative 
effect of defl ation on growth using lagged price 
change. However, their results have markedly 
smaller economic and statistical signifi cance 
when they use a long, historical dataset (which 
includes pre-World War I data) than when they 
rely on post-World War II data. As they write: 
“Our results are much stronger for the postwar 
dataset than for the historical dataset, perhaps 
because the more developed economies were 
more likely to have experienced productivity-
led defl ation prior to the Great Depression.” 
(Guerrero & Parker, 2006, p. 15.) We think that 
the effect of productivity improvements might 
be more pronounced in our study because 
we cover not only sectors producing for fi nal 
consumption, but also sectors producing 
capital goods and intermediate inputs farther 
away in the production chain. Because the 
Czech economy has a relatively high share of 
manufacturing in total production, the effects 
of productivity improvements may demonstrate 
themselves relatively strongly in our results (In 
services, productivity improvements are often 
more diffi cult to achieve.).
There is one caveat to make. Our regression 
analysis assumes that all sectors have equal 
weights, which of course is not true in terms of 
their share in GDP, employment, etc. However, 
our goal was to assess defl ation-recession 
theories. If a theory is correct, it should work 
both for big sectors and small ones. Therefore, 
from the point of view of theory, both big and 
small sectors should have the same weight 
because they all represent independent 
observations on which theory can be tested.
Conclusion
The sector approach that we have used in this 
study allows us to look ‘under’ aggregates such 
as GDP and overall infl ation. While the Czech 
economy has seen positive overall infl ation in 
most years (similarly to other economies), the 
sector analysis shows that the tendency to 
have defl ation or lower-than-average infl ation 
of product prices is linked to sectors with higher 
growth in production.
This has an important implication for the 
‘delayed-spending’ theory of defl ation and 
recession. If consumers and fi rms delayed 
spending in response to declining prices, it would 
not be the sectors with the highest production 
growth that have defl ation in their product prices. 
As a result, our results cast doubt on the validity 
of this theory, at least in the setting of the Czech 
economy. Our fi nding also suggests that the strict 
view that defl ation is always and everywhere 
harmful may well be incorrect.
Furthermore, we have also found a negative 
relationship between price growth and growth 
in gross value added. This suggests that when 
fi rms cut prices or raise them slower than the 
average, their gross profi t does not shrink but, 
contrarily, grows quickly. This runs against 
another theory of defl ation and recession – 
one that asserts that falling prices erode fi rms’ 
profi ts, ultimately pushing them into bankruptcy.
Overall, our results show that most of the 
defl ationary pressures in the Czech economy in 
1993-2015 have been of the ‘good’ type, which 
in our view reduces the need of monetary policy 
to counteract it. We believe that sector analysis 
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is a promising way to expand our knowledge 
on the relationship between production and 
prices. A logical follow-up on our study would 
be a more detailed look at fi rms’ profi ts and 
productivity in sectors with infl ation versus 
those with defl ation.
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Appendix
In Section 3, we explored how much growth in production or GVA there is under infl ation and 
defl ation. To give a complete picture, we now reverse our perspective and look into how prices grow 
under increases versus decreases in production or GVA.
As seen in Tab. 6, the average growth of prices is signifi cantly higher when production 
decreases. In addition, there are more observations of defl ation when production grows (23.1%) 
than when production declines (15.7%).
By the same token, prices grow slower under increasing GVA than under decreasing GVA. 
Relatively more cases of defl ation are recorded when GVA grows (27.4%) than when it falls (10.6%).
The statistical tests in Tab. 7 conclude that neither the average price changes nor variances of 
prices changes are equal and that this result is valid for both production and GVA. In other words, 
the average growth of prices is signifi cantly higher when production or GVA falls.
Finally, we visualize our fi ndings in Fig. 4. It is the observations with production and GVA 
increase that tend to have slower price growth or outright defl ation.
In sum, our fi nding from Section 3 also works the other way round: not only is defl ation 
associated with quicker output growth than infl ation, but output increases are usually accompanied 
by lower growth of prices than output decreases.
All data Production increase Production decrease
Observations 1,892 1,154 738
Price change
obs. with price increase 79.8% 76.9% 84.3%
obs. with price decrease 20.2% 23.1% 15.7%
Average price growth 3.71 2.82 5.09
Price growth st. deviation 6.14 4.88 7.51
All data GVA increase GVA decrease
Observations 1,892 1,087 805
Price change
obs. with price increase 79.8% 72.6% 89.4%
obs. with price decrease 20.2% 27.4% 10.6%
Average price growth 3.71 2.26 5.65
Price growth st. deviation 6.14 5.30 6.65
Source: Czech Statistical Offi ce (2017), own computations
Tab. 6: Growth of prices under increase and decrease of production or GVA
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Fig. 4: Density of price growth under production growth and production decline
Source: Czech Statistical Offi ce (2017), own computations
Test statistic p-value
Price growth under production increase/decrease
t-test for equality of means 7.30 <0.001
F-test for equality of variances 2.36 <0.001
Price growth under GVA increase/decrease
t-test for equality of means 11.9 <0.001
F-test for equality of variances 1.58 <0.001
Source: Czech Statistical Offi ce (2017), own computations
Tab. 7: Test of equality of means and variances
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Abstract
DEFLATION AND OUTPUT ACROSS SECTORS: RESULTS 
FOR THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Pavel Ryska, Petr Sklenář
The present paper looks into the relationship between defl ation and economic output. Previous 
studies relied uniquely on annual macroeconomic data on GDP and prices, which caused lack 
of observations on defl ation. This paper uses panel data on 86 sectors of the Czech economy 
in 1993-2015, which offer more variation in price changes and display frequent observations of 
defl ation. Our goal is to test the hypothesis whether defl ation negatively affects output growth – 
as is commonly thought – and whether central banks should counter all defl ation that appears. 
The most common argument against defl ation is that decreasing prices lead consumers and fi rms 
to postpone purchases, which in turn depresses output.
We fi nd that (1) sectors with output price defl ation and below-average infl ation have higher 
growth rate of output, and that (2) these sectors also tend to show quicker growth in gross value 
added. This evidence contradicts the often held notion that defl ation is linked with recession or 
subpar growth. It also shows that fi rms with defl ating output prices do not have trouble preserving 
their profi ts. Defl ation observed in the Czech economy in 1993-2015 is likely to be the result of 
falling unit costs enabled by fi rms’ investment rather than the result of falling demand. This might 
have policy implications. Our results highlight that monetary policy should differentiate among 
sources of defl ation and that defl ation observed in the Czech Republic has been rather of the ‘good’ 
type. We believe that our approach using sector data is novel because it uncovers more variation in 
prices and output than the more common approach that uses macroeconomic aggregates.
Key Words: Defl ation, price level, economic growth, panel data.
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